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THE WHITE PAPER: THE STEALTH
BOMBER OF THE SECTION 482
ARSENAL
by Josh 0. Ungerman
UTHORIZED by an extremely broad and ambiguous statute, the
government holds the power to reallocate the tax benefits and bur-
dens of two related entities in order to reflect clearly their respective
incomes.I Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code vests this power in the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. 2 The exercise of this power
may potentially affect both domestic and multinational companies.3 Domes-
tic corporations may feel at the mercy of a Commissioner whose adjustment
to their tax liability could potentially create devastating effects. On an inter-
national scale, the problem manifests itself in two ways: corporations not
only may face the possibility of paying an additional unplanned tax to the
United States Government, but also must comply with the demands of their
own country's taxing authority. The magnitude and effect of adjustments
under section 482 appear to have few or no boundaries. 4 Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical situation.
The doctors and scientists at the Research and Development Laboratories
of DowJohn Company realize that the side effect of one of their products
1. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any of such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or
license) of intangible property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the
income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the
income attributable to the intangible.
I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
2. Section 482 specifically gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to reallocate
income, deductions, credits, and allowances, but § 7802(c) authorizes the Secretary to assign
powers and duties to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue. Id. § 7802(a).
3. Section 482 parenthetically refers to business entities "whether or not incorporated
. . . in the United States." Id. § 482.
4. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 966 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 88-2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 9502 (7th Cir. 1988) (IRS assessed Eli Lilly total
deficiency of $34,220,347 based on § 482 adjustments for tax years 1971 through 1973); Hospi-
tal Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 520 (1983) (IRS made § 482-related assessments of
$29,187,645); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928 (1970) (IRS assessed $5,495,389
in additional taxes pursuant to § 482 adjustments).
1107
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
will prevent and possibly restore human hair loss. Recognizing the market
potential for DowJohn's hair treatment product, DowJohn immediately en-
gages in an aggressive marketing strategy. Next, DowJohn creates a manu-
facturing subsidiary in Puerto Rico, DowJohn P.R., responsible for
manufacturing the hair loss formula. DowJohn subsequently transfers the
hair formula patents and know-how to DowJohn P.R. in exchange for
DowJohn P.R.'s stock.
The heads of DowJohn and DowJohn P.R. negotiate and arrive at a price
for which DowJohn P.R. agrees to sell the finished product to DowJohn.
The price at which DowJohn P.R. sells the product to DowJohn is known as
the transfer price. As anticipated, the product enjoys much success.
Three years later, the Internal Revenue Service examines DowJohn's op-
erations and concludes that DowJohn P.R. must reduce the transfer price,
thereby causing DowJohn to realize more profits from the resale of the prod-
uct. DowJohn enters into a written agreement for a new transfer price
formula with the Service, even though the agreement will increase
DowJohn's taxes by millions of dollars per year.
DowJohn continues to apply the agreed formula to determine the transfer
price for the next few years, until the Service expresses renewed dissatisfac-
tion with the intercorporate transactions. Due to competitors' independent
development of the formula used in DowJohn's patent, the Service concludes
that DowJohn's transfer price, once again, does not clearly reflect the proper
income of the entire company. Consequently, the Service recomputes the
transfer price using a different formula. The government's "new" transfer
price has the same effect as the previous transfer price in that DowJohn
incurs an onerous tax liability.
DowJohn's theoretical situation represents more than the abstract scena-
rio that appears in the nightmares of large corporations' presidents.
DowJohn's situation represents the seemingly unlimited power granted to
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in section 482, "Alloca-
tion of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers."' 5 Section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code grants the Secretary of the Treasury the power to
allocate income, deductions, credits, or allowances among controlled taxpay-
ers; the Secretary's reallocation must prevent the evasion of taxes or distor-
tion of income between two controlled organizations. 6 In response to
congressional pressures, 7 the Treasury Department promulgated regulations
in 1968 covering section 482.8 The 1968 regulations apply to tangible and
intangible property. 9 Even after the Treasury issued the 1968 regulations,
Congress felt that section 482 failed in its goals of preventing evasion of
taxes and distinction of income with regard to transfers of intangibles be-
5. I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
6. Id.
7. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3297, 3739.
8. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.482-1(d) to -2(e) (1968).
9. See id. § 1.482-2(c) (use of tangible property), § 1.482-2(d) (transfer or use of intangi-
ble property), § 1.482-2(e) (sales of tangible property).
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tween related parties.' 0 Moreover, Congress felt that the "arm's length"
rules" incorporated in the 1968 regulations resulted in an unfair allocation
of income among related taxpayers. 12 Consequently, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA of 1986) included an amendment to section 482 requiring that
payments pursuant to the transfer or license of intangible property be com-
mensurate with income attributable to the intangible. 13 The 1986 amend-
ment to section 482 is commonly referred to as the "super royalty
provision." 1 4 The Conference Committee Report dealing with the super
royalty provision also called for a comprehensive study of intercompany
pricing by the Internal Revenue Service. 15 The discussion draft of this
study, also known as the "Section 482 White Paper,"' 16 ultimately appeared
in the latter part of 1988.
This Comment analyzes the problems associated with section 482 and the
new super royalty provision and evaluates the White Paper's recommended
treatment of these problems. Specifically, the Comment examines the his-
tory of section 482, including the section's necessity in relation to the recent
general economic climate in the United States. The Comment next identifies
limits of the broad power authorized by section 482, particularly with regard
to various judicial and treaty interpretations of section 482. An analysis of
the super royalty provision follows, including the White Paper's responses.
Finally, an inquiry probes the impacts of the super royalty provision in light
of the present economic conditions of the United States as a world power.
I. OVERSEEING INTERCORPORATE TAX MANIPULATIONS: THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 482
A. From Consolidation to Allocation
The legislature responded to potential pricing abuses in the War Revenue
Act of 1917 by requiring every corporation to supply the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service with information describing its relations with
other affiliated corporations. 17 The Commissioner required corporations to
10. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 424 (1985).
11. Treasury Regulation § 1.482-1(a)(6) makes the initial reference to an "arm's length"
standard in the context of defining "true taxable income." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(6) (1968).
12. See STAFF ON JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 1014-15 (Comm. Print 1986).
13. Section 1231(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA of 1986) accomplished this
change by adding one sentence to Code section 482. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63.
14. The term "super royalty" refers to the situation in which a licensor of royalties enjoys
extraordinarily high royalty payments. The super royalty provision ensures the allocation of
royalty payments between the licensor and the licensee to reflect the proper amount of the
royalty income attributable to each party. See Looman, Symons, Patrick & Simpson, San
Francisco Roundtable Discusses the "Super Royalty" and Other Transfer Pricing Issues Affect-
ing Intangibles, INT'L TAX REV., July/Aug. 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Looman].
15. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986).
16. Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, A Study of Intercompany Pricing
(Discussion Draft, Oct. 18, 1988) [hereinafter White Paper].
17. Regulation 41, articles 77-78, War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
Code sections 1501 through 1505 currently deal with consolidated return filing. I.R.C.
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file consolidated tax returns to properly "determine" income.18 The Reve-
nue Act of 1921 vested the Commissioner with the direct power to prepare
consolidated tax returns in order to reflect the taxpayer's "accurate" in-
come.19 Seven years later Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1928, which
included section 45, labeled "Allocation of Income and Deductions."'20
With section 45 Congress went beyond the narrow scope of the consolidated
return provisions of prior revenue acts into the broader area of allocation of
income and deductions. 21 The legislative history provided the Commis-
sioner with authority to make allocations necessary in order to prevent tax
evasion and to reflect clearly the "true" tax liability of commonly controlled
businesses. 22
The early regulations and case law arising under section 45 of the Revenue
Act of 1928 established the statutory underpinnings of section 482.23 Treas-
ury regulations issued in 1935 provided another cornerstone in the develop-
ment of section 482 with the mandated use of an arm's length standard. 24
The regulations required that taxpayers treat their transactions, in all cases,
as if the negotiations involved uncontrolled taxpayers dealing at arm's
length.25 The 1935 regulations did not define the term "uncontrolled tax-
§§ 1501-1505 (1986). Companies that file consolidated tax returns benefit when the affiliated
corporations' respective strengths and weaknesses offset each other.
18. Regulation 41, art. 78, War Revenue Act of 1917.
19. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 260 (1921).
20. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806 (1928).
21. While § 240(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 stated that "the Commissioner may con-
solidate the accounts of ... related trades and businesses," § 45 of the 1928 Act provided that
"the Commissioner is authorized to . . . allocate gross income . . . among such trades or
businesses .... " See statutes cited supra notes 19, 20.
22. The report from the House Ways and Means Committee on the Revenue Bill of 1928
stated that "the Commissioner may ... apportion, allocate or distribute the income or deduc-
tions ... in order to prevent evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales,
and other methods adopted for the purpose of "milking"), and in order clearly to reflect ...
true tax liability." H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928).
23. The following statutes reflect almost identical terminology: Section 45 of the Code
states:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross in-
come, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 45 (1939). Section 482 of the Code states:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1954).
24. Treas. Regs. 86, § 45-1(b) (1935). "The standard to be applied in every case is that of




payers," but implied that it meant two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses with no common interests. 26
The cases arising under section 45 interpreted the Code section broadly. 27
As early as 1935, Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner2 8 held that the
phrase "evasion of taxes" in section 45 reached broadly enough to include
the avoidance of realization of income through the transfer of profits by sub-
sidiary corporations. The court further held that section 45 applied to tax
avoidance by a subsidiary of either a foreign or domestic parent.29 Central
Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner,30 decided in 1952, allowed reallocation of
operating expense deductions without inquiry into the possibility of tax eva-
sion by Central Cuba Sugar Company. The court interpreted section 45 as
not requiring the Internal Revenue Service actually to prove tax evasion in
order to apply section 45.31
B. 1968 Section 482 Regulations: Determining an Arm's Length Price
Although the Treasury released a short set of regulations in 1962 that
described the scope and application of section 482,32 the House and Senate
debated the issue of amending the Code section itself during that same
year.33 The House sought to add a subsection (b) to section 482.34 The
proposed subsection would have assigned the Secretary of the Treasury the
role of allocating taxable income among related entities, including foreign
corporations.35 The allocated income was to be based on the revenue gener-
ated by the sale of tangible property between the members of the group. 36
The Senate, however, eventually convinced the House that the allocation
objective could best be accomplished through additional regulations promul-
gated by the Treasury. 37
26. Id. § 45-1(a)(4).
27. See White Paper, supra note 16, at 7.
28. 79 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
29. Id. Asiatic Petroleum demonstrated the awesome power inherent in § 45, the forerun-
ner of § 482. The application of § 45 to multinational business entities foreshadowed the di-
rection and emphasis of Congress's transfer pricing regime. Traditionally, the committee
reports explaining § 45 refer to-foreign subsidiaries "milking" U.S. parent corporations. The
Second Circuit held that § 45 also applied to situations involving foreign parent corporations.
79 F.2d at 236.
30. 198 F.2d 214, 215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
31. Id.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) to -1(c) (1962).
33. See infra notes 34-37.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 29 (1962).
35. Id.
36. Id. The committee report stipulated that the allocation rule was generally discretion-
ary, but that it would not apply when the taxpayer could establish an arm's length price for the
goods in question. Id. Although the report described an allocation process based on the pro-
portion of assets, employee compensation, and promotional expenses attributable to U.S. ver-
sus non-U.S. sales, the report also sanctioned the taxpayer and the Secretary "work[ing] out
some other mutually agreeable method." Id.
37. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The Senate stated:
Section 482 already contains broad authority to the Secretary of the Treasury or
his delegate to allocate income and deductions. It is believed that the Treasury
should explore the possibility of developing and promulgating regulations under
1989] 1111
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The Treasury acted on Congress's recommendations and ultimately issued
additional section 482 regulations in 1968.38 The 1968 regulations substan-
tially increased the volume of statutory material relating to section 482.
While the earlier regulations established the basic ideas of the section's appli-
cation to international transactions and the concept of measuring all transac-
tions on an arm's length basis, the 1968 regulations expanded these key ideas
and laid down the framework for dealing with specific.types of transactions.
The 1968 regulations, most of which remain in effect and unchanged since
issuance, provide guidance on the transfer or sale of services, tangible prop-
erty, and intangible property.39 The regulations mandate allocations in the
event that the amount charged for a service differs from an arm's length
charge.40 An arm's length charge for services theoretically equals the
amount independently charged for the same or similar services among unre-
lated parties in similar circumstances.4 1 The regulations state, however, that
generally the arm's length charge is deemed to be equal to the costs or de-
ductions incurred by the members with respect to the services.42
The regulations guiding the determination of an arm's length price for the
sale of tangible property between commonly controlled companies provide a
complex hierarchy of methods.4 3 To convert a "controlled sale" 44 price to
an arm's length price, the regulations offer four methods: (1) the Compara-
ble Uncontrolled Price Method;45 (2) the Resale Price Method;46 (3) the
Cost Plus Method;47 and (4) an unspecified "fourth method."' 48 The regula-
tions require the taxpayer to attempt to apply the methods in sequence be-
ginning with the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method. 49 If the factors
this authority which would provide additional guidelines and formulas for the
allocation of income and deductions in cases involving foreign income.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2508, supra note 7, at 18-19, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3739.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) to -2(e) (1968).
39. See supra note 9. Regulation § 1.482-2(a) deals with loans or advances made between
members of a group of controlled entities and the determination of appropriate arm's length
interest rates. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (1968); see id. § 1.482-1(a)(1) to -1(a)(6)-(7) (defining
terms under § 1.482-2).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(1) (1968).
41. § 1.482-2(b)(3).
42. Id.
43. See § 1.482-2(e)(1) to -2(e)(4).
44. The regulations define a "controlled sale" as a sale "[w]here one member of a group of
controlled entities ... sells or otherwise disposes of tangible property to another member of
such group ... at other than an arm's length price . § 1.482-2(e)(1)(i).
45. § 1.482-2(e)(2).
Despite the fact that the regulations restrict the "methods" approach of price allocation
exclusively to the subsection titled "Sales of Tangible Assets," the courts have consistently
applied this concept in the area of intercompany use or transfer of intangible assets. The
regulations that deal with intangibles, however, simply apply "factors" to consider in price
allocation. They fail to mention a methods approach. Revenue Procedure 63-10 could con-
ceivably be interpreted as sanctioning the methods approach to intangibles' price allocation
since it describes intangibles in terms of their sale-price impact on "products." See Rev. Proc.






necessary to apply a particular method are unavailable or undeterminable,
the taxpayer tries the next method. As a last resort, the regulations permit
the use of a "fourth method," which amounts to any alternative method that
satisfies the basic objectives of the regulations.50
The 1968 regulations also address the issue of companies under common
control using or transferring intangible property.51 As with services and
tangible property, the regulations authorize the Service to reallocate costs
when related parties fail to charge an arm's length price for the purchase or
use of an intangible. 52 The regulations define intangibles broadly, listing pat-
ents, processes, copyrights, artistic compositions, trademarks, franchises,
licenses, methods, technical data, and other similar items.5 3
In determining what constitutes "arm's length consideration" for the
transfer or use of intangibles, the Service applies the standard test: the
amount that would have been paid by an unrelated party for the same intan-
gible property under the same circumstances. 54 In the absence of compara-
tive unrelated party transactions, the regulations provide twelve factors
designed to assist in arriving at an arm's length price. 55 Thus while the Ser-
vice applies a cost-oriented "methods" approach to the sale of tangibles, the
50. § 1.482-2(e)(l)(iv). Treasury Regulation § 1.482-2(c) deals with the use (as opposed
to sale) of tangible property. See § 1.482-2(c)(1). The Service generally makes allocations to
reflect an arm's length charge on the basis of the amount of time the respective entities used
the asset. See § 1.482-2(c)(2).
51. See § 1.482-2(d).
52. § 1.482-2(d)(1).
53. The regulations' complete list of intangibles includes:
(a) Patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns, and other
similar items;
(b) Copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic compositions, and other similar
items;
(c) Trademarks, trade names, brand names, and other similar items;
(d) Franchises, licenses, contracts, and other similar items;
(e) Methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies,
forecasts, estimates, customer lists, technical data, and other similar items.
§ 1.482-2(d)(3).
54. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(ii).
55. In determining an arm's length price, the Service inquires into:
(1) prevailing rates in the same industry for the same property;
(2) offers of competing transferors or bids of competing transferees;
(3) terms of a transfer, including geographic areas covered exclusively and
rights granted;
(4) uniqueness of property and life-span of that uniqueness;
(5) protection (degree and duration) to property available under laws of the
relevant countries;
(6) value of services provided by the transferor to the transferee;
(7) transferee's prospective profits or cost savings from the use or subsequent
transfer of the property;
(8) transferee's investment and start-up costs;
(9) availability of substitutes for the transferred property;
(10) arm's length rates and prices determined by unrelated parties in a resale
or sub-licensing arrangement;
(11) costs borne by the transferor in the development of the property; and
(12) any other fact or circumstance that unrelated parties would be likely to




government simply stipulates relevant "factors" when focusing on the arm's
length price of intangibles. 56
C. The Court's Role in Defining "Arm's Length"
After the Service implemented the section 482 regulations, companies at-
tempted to put the Treasury's methods into practice. In light of the com-
plexities of the regulations, however, IRS agents inevitably concluded that
some taxpayers had incorrectly applied section 482. Many corporations,
faced with the broad power of the Service in the transfer pricing area, opted
to settle with the government.5 7 Other companies, however, refused to ac-
cept the Service's section 482 reallocations and turned to the judiciary. Pre-
dictably, the Treasury Department viewed some of the courts decisions as
reflecting too much bias in favor of the taxpayer.5 8 On the other hand, the
cases represent the judiciary's limit on the broad power vested in the Service
in the transfer pricing area.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner59 represents the type of situation over
which the IRS felt dissatisfied. 6° Lilly developed and patented two manufac-
turing intangibles, Darvon and Darvon-N. Lilly subsequently deducted re-
search and development costs in accordance with the appropriate Code
sections.6' Next, Lilly made a section 351 tax-free transfer of the patents
and manufacturing know-how to its subsidiary, a Puerto Rican possession
corporation. 62 The subsidiary manufactured Darvon and Darvon-N in Pu-
erto Rico and sold the drugs to Lilly for resale to wholesalers in the United
States. 63 Lilly had effectively shifted the income associated with the in-
tangibles outside of the United States tax base, to which the IRS protested. 6 4
Lilly enjoyed the benefits of massive research and development deductions65
without experiencing the burden of a tax on the intangible's profit.66 The
Service argued for the allocation to Lilly of the profits derived from the in-
tangibles, regardless of the tax-free transfer to Lilly's possession subsidiary. 67
The Service further contended that no comparable transactions existed. 6 8
The Tax Court accepted only parts of the government's argument. Upon
56. Compare § i.482-2(e)(l)(ii) (identifying the various methods used for determining an
arm's length price for the sale of tangible property among members of a controlled group) with
§ 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii) (listing factors relevant to determine an arm's length price for transfer or
use of intangibles).
57. See Schindler, Intercorporate Transfer Pricing, 19 TAX ADVISOR 378, 380-81 (1988)
(discussing problems with transfer pricing).
58. See Looman, supra note 14, at 2 (describing decisions as "ad hoc" and "arbitrary").
59. 84 T.C. 996 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1988-2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
9502 (7th Cir. 1988).
60. Looman, supra note 14, at 2.
61. Eli Lilly, 84 T.C. at 1062-63.
62. Id. at 1113-14.
63. Id. at 1052.
64. See Driscoll, Income Shifting for Intangible Property Transferred Abroad, 14 INT'L
TAX J. 165, 175 (1988).
65. Eli Lilly, 84 T.C. at 1062.
66. Id. at 1133.
67. Id. at 1125.
68. Id. at 1134-35.
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finding no comparable transaction under the three methods explicitly stated
in the section 482 regulation, 69 the court applied a profit-split approach. 70
The profit split resulted in the allocation of 45% of the intangible income to
Lilly as a marketing profit and 55% of the intangible income to Lilly's pos-
session subsidiary as a manufacturing profit. 71 The Tax Court simply stated
that with regard to the 45-55 profit split, the court had used its best judg-
ment and that the taxpayer's failure to support the transfer prices under the
arm's length standard was to its own detriment. 72
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's profit split, but
refused to enforce the court's allocation of some of Eli Lilly's general re-
search and development expenses to its subsidiary. 73 The appeals court thus
affirmed the Tax Court's decision to reject Lilly's allocation method, but
reversed in part with regard to how the Tax Court had applied its alternative
method. 74 Since the Tax Court did not specify the amount of this particular
allocation, the appeals court remanded the case. 75 Regardless of the 45-55
profit split, Lilly still managed to reduce its tax liability significantly by
transferring the manufacturing intangibles to its Puerto Rican subsidiary. 76
The Service perceived several cases as pro-taxpayer. In G. 0. Searle & Co.
v. Commissioner77 the taxpayer transferred the patents or licenses related to
five out of the company's seven major product lines to its subsidiary, Searle
& Co. (hereinafter SCO), which was operating as a possession corporation in
Puerto Rico.78 Searle subsequently marketed the products in the United
States acting as an agent of its subsidiary, SCO. The intangible accounted
for close to 80% of Searle's profits. 79 The Service argued for a section 482
reallocation of the profits from the intangibles.8 0 The Tax Court found pre-
vious licenses held by Searle to be noncomparable and refused to use them as
a safe harbor when resolving the case. 81 The Tax Court mandated a profit
69. Id. at 1147. The regulations specify the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method, the
Resale Price Method, and the Cost Plus Method. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(2), -2(e)(3),
(2)(e)(4) (1968).
70. 84 T.C. at 1152-53. A profit-split approach treats the members of a controlled group
as a single economic entity, allocating its total net profit among the separate members based on
their respective economic contributions. See I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(ii)(II) (1986).
71. 84 T.C. at 1167.
72. Id.
73. Eli Lilly, 1988-2 Stan. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 9502, at 85,457, 85,470 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 85,471.
75. Id.
76. See Driscoll, supra note 60.
77. 88 T.C. 252 (1987).
78. Id. at 271-72. Searle, through SCO's exploitation of Searle's manufacturing in-
tangibles, achieved a massive income shift outside of the U.S. tax base while concurrently
experiencing net losses from multimillion dollar deductions for research and development
costs. Congress created the deductions as an intended tool for increasing research and
development.
79. Id. at 370.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 374. Previously Searle had licensed two of the five controverted intangibles
from a European pharmaceutical firm through licensing agreements requiring 8-10% of net
sales as royalty payments. Id. The Tax Court found that the licensing agreements failed to
constitute unrelated party transactions under the arm's length standard because the parties
consummated the agreements before the Food and Drug Administration ever approved the
1989] 1115
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split8 2 of 25%, which the Treasury felt allocated too small a percentage of
profits from the possession corporation, SCO, to the parent corporation,
G.D. Searle & Company. 83
Like Searle, the court in Hospital Corporation of America v. Commis-
sioner8 4 applied a profit-split approach in a situation classified as not techni-
cally appropriate for the use of a fourth method. 85 The court allocated 75%
of the profit to Hospital Corporation of America for the transfer of its ex-
tremely profitable and noncomparable intangibles. 86 The Treasury once
again felt that the reallocation resulted in too little profit allocated to the
parent corporation. 87
The three cases described above dealt with the situation in which no ade-
quate comparables existed. In United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner88
the parent company, U.S. Steel, accounted for approximately 75% of the
business transacted by its subsidiary, Navios. 89 Navios and U.S. Steel's ship-
ping contracts covered substantially longer periods of time than Navios's
other shipping contracts. 90 Navios, however, charged U.S. Steel the same
rates that it charged unrelated parties.91 The Service contended that the rate
Navios charged for shipping ore from Venezuela to the United States ex-
ceeded an arm's length rate. The Service introduced figures indicating that
U.S. Steel could have shipped the same amount of ore for considerably less
money.92 U.S. Steel argued that a perfect comparable existed because Na-
vios charged U.S. Steel and unrelated parties the same shipping rates, and
the comparable adequately represented an arm's length price.93
Hearing the case on appeal, the Second Circuit found the unrelated party
transactions constituted appropriate comparables. 94 The court held that
when an appropriate comparable existed to justify the price charged, an allo-
drugs. Id. at 374-75. The court states: "There is little hard evidence from which we can
determine what consideration petitioner would have demanded had the transactions under
scrutiny here taken place between unrelated parties dealing at arm's length." Id. at 373.
82. Cf Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985). The Tax Court's profit split
technically falls outside the gambit of the "fourth method" profit split utilized in Lilly since
SCO did not sell the products to Searle and therefore no intercompany sales income existed for
the court to reallocate under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii).
83. Searle, 88 T.C. at 376. The original allocation proposed by the Service allocated more
than 92% of SCO's gross income to G.D. Searle & Co. Id.
84. 81 T.C. 520 (1981).
85. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii) (1968).
86. 81 T.C. at 601. Hospital Corporation of America describes its "system" in an annual
report: "The 'combination of medical-financial-administrative orientation and skills at all
levels of the management structure provides the ideal combination for the effective manage-
ment of hospitals. It is unique within the health care industry and is one of the company's
most important competitive advantages.' " Id. at 600.
87. Id. at 602. The IRS argued for a 100% allocation of the profits to Hospital Corpora-
tion of America. Id.
88. 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'g 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1977).
89. United States Steel, 36 T.C.M. at 598.
90. Id. at 595.
91. Id. at 594.
92. Id. at 605.
93. Id. at 602.
94. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942, 942-43 (1980).
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cation under section 482 would not apply even if the upholding of the com-
parable potentially results in the shifting of tax liability between related
parties.95 In holding that the shipping services were adequately similar, the
court found the term "comparable" not synonymous with the term
"identical." 96
In an earlier case in the transfer pricing area, R. T French & Co. v. Com-
missioner,97 the Tax Court addressed the controversial issue of using hind-
sight to evaluate intercompany royalty agreements. R. T French involved a
twenty-year license between a British corporation and its U.S. affiliate R.T.
French.98 The license allowed the U.S. company to manufacture instant
mashed potatoes following a patented process. The Service alleged that the
U.S. licensee received very little benefit for the royalty payments in the final
two years of the twenty-year license. 99 By 1963 the patented process for
making instant mashed potatoes was no longer unique and the food industry
commonly understood the process. 10 The Tax Court ruled in favor of the
taxpayer, upholding the royalty payments.10 The court stated that if a li-
censing agreement contained reasonable payments in accordance with arm's
length principles at its creation, then the IRS could not subsequently reallo-
cate under section 482 purely on hindsight.'0 2 Regardless of the judiciary's
view on the use of hindsight, the IRS supported its hindsight approach in a
1973 Technical Advice Memorandum.10 3 The memorandum advocated
yearly review of long-term agreements to determine whether unrelated par-
ties in the same circumstances would modify the agreement.'4
The aforementioned cases further amplified the Treasury Department's
dissatisfaction with the current transfer pricing structure. The Treasury De-
partment felt that United States companies were engaged in researching and
developing patents, copyrights, and know-how in the United States while at
95. Id. at 951.
96. Id.
97. 60 T.C. 836 (1973).
98. Id. at 850.
99. Id. at 854.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 836.
102. Id. at 854; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 548, 567 (1986) (in the
absence of contract provisions, court held that market fluctuations are risk factor in long run
as well as short term and that reasonableness of rate viewed with clarity of hindsight held
generally irrelevant).
103. I.R.S. Technical Advice Memorandum 8,002,001 provides:
We believe that a reevaluation should be made for each subsequent year to de-
termine if unrelated parties would have continued under the arrangement. ...
[I]n determining whether unrelated parties would have continued under Agree-
ment J [the agreement that the letter ruling concerns], the more specific inquiry
is whether unrelated parties would have continued under that Agreement where
each of the parties possessed the right to terminate the Agreement on one-year's
notice.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,002,001 (May 20, 1979). The case and the technical advice memorandum
suggest conflicting ideologies between the judiciary and the administrative branches of the
government. By issuing Technical Advice Memorandum 8,002,001, the Service expressed its




the same time reaping the benefits of their expenditures on their present U.S.
tax returns. 10 5 The Treasury felt that the U.S. companies subsequently
transferred or sold the same intangibles to related foreign affiliates, prefera-
bly located in a tax haven, for a much lower price than to unrelated parties
in the same situation. 106 The Treasury perceived further violations of the
arm's length standard when companies used inside information to selectively
transfer incomplete or untested intangibles, a system commonly referred to
as "cherry picking."' 10 7
D. Defects in the Arm's Length Standard
The number of international business transactions in the last few decades
has increased dramatically. 108 Traditionally, international business transac-
tions have involved the imports and exports of end products. 109 Companies
eventually realized, however, that more active involvement in international
markets translates into higher profits. 110 Companies transacting business in-
ternationally ultimately developed into multinational conglomerates. As a
result, a decrease in the amount of unrelated transactions accompanied the
growth of many large corporations. Consequently, taxing authorities antici-
pated a storm of unanswered issues on the horizon.I'
Congress began to express concern that the pre-1986 regulatory scheme
dealing with intercompany transfer pricing issues had failed to accomplish
the goal of establishing uniform arm's length prices. 1 2 The problems with
the scheme consist of lack of comparables, lack of one price, differing facts
and circumstances, and uncertainty of application. 113 The lack of com-
parables necessary to determine an arm's length price constitutes a key prob-
lem in related party transactions. 1 4 At the far end of the spectrum,
industries such as the vertically integrated petroleum industry operate in an
environment virtually without unrelated party transactions. More com-
monly, the problem of inadequate comparables arises in situations where
companies keep their more lucrative know-how and intangibles to them-
selves. Companies in this situation prefer to exploit the intangible or know-
how through existing or future facilities and personnel all within a com-
monly controlled group. 51 5
The statute's view of how corporations operate amplifies the lack of com-
105. Looman, supra note 14, at 2. The Treasury also perceived abuses of cost-sharing
agreements in which the parent corporation received no credit for prior research.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Kahley, Direct Investment Activity of Foreign Firms, ECON. REV., Summer 1987,
at 36, 37-38.
109. See French, High Noon Could Draw a Blank, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1987, at 109.
110. See Schindler, supra note 57, at 379.
111. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423 (1985).
113. Id. at 423-26.
114. Id. at 423-24. The report noted that transactions between unrelated parties also
presented the problem of inconsistent results derived while attempting to apply the arm's
length standard in the absence of comparables. Id.
115. See Schindler, supra note 57, at 379-80.
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parables problem for pricing considerations." 16 Section 482 treats all corpo-
rations in a controlled group of companies as unrelated parties.' 17 In reality
relationships differ between related and unrelated parties."i 8 Multinational
corporations conduct operations on a company-wide level acting as one re-
lated company.' ' 9 The parent corporation treats affiliates and subsidiaries as
related parties. Attempting to treat these subsidiaries and affiliates as other
than related parties creates a legal fiction. The commonly controlled group
operates more efficiently than unrelated corporations because certain func-
tions benefit all of the related companies, eliminating the need for each com-
pany to perform them separately. 120 Examples of such functions include
product development, market planning, and administrative functions.' 2'
Furthermore, related party transactions involve much less risk than unre-
lated party transactions. 22 The benefits of a particular transaction contrib-
ute to the equity interest of the related parties as a whole, with little regard
to the transfer price selected.' 23
The lack of a single price and the absence of similar facts and circum-
stances also complicate the task of attempting to apply the arm's length stan-
dard.124 An arm's length analysis commonly allows for a range of prices,
including many single prices.' 25 Current business practices exemplify this
problem: The price that an unrelated company pays for a product is contin-
gent upon factors such as general market conditions, availability of the prod-
uct, past dealings between buyer and seller, and the seller's incentives.' 26
The failure to consider varying facts and circumstances is inherent in the
problem of attempting to determine a single price. 127
Corporations also often make current business decisions based on long-
term goals and objectives. A current pricing decision of a company will not
necessarily represent a true arm's length price. 128 An arm's length compara-
ble transaction based upon a corporation's attempting to break into a new
market fails to reflect the arm's length price applicable to related parties
attempting to exit from a certain market. 29 The unrelated parties' arm's
length price appears adequate on its face, but the facts and circumstances
differ in an economic sense from those of the related parties.' 30 The same
116. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 424 (1985).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1962).
118. See Schindler, supra note 57, at 380. Related parties benefit through the use of struc-
tural interaction such as horizontal and vertical integration of resources, mechanisms not






124. See Levey & Ruchelman, Section 482-The Super Royalty Provisions Adopt the Com-
mensurate Standard, 41 TAX LAW. 611, 633-35 (1988).
125. Id. at 634.
126. See id.
127. Id.





problems occur on a micro level. The unrelated arm's length price that ex-
ceeds the related party's price may ignore the fact that the related buyer
experiences different credit terms, warranties, services, and support than the
unrelated buyer.! 31
The final problem with the arm's length standard centers on uncertainty
involved in determining an arm's length price. 132 The regulations go into
great detail in describing the methodology for determining an arm's length
price. 1 33 In the area of tangible property, the regulations provide for a sub-
jective judgment by the taxpayer in reconciling potential 6omparables with
the actual transaction.134 Factors to be considered include quantity, terms,
and time of the sale, plus pretense of intangibles and level of the market. 35
Evaluation of the factors relevant to the transfer and use of intangibles also
requires subjective determinations of whether and to what extent they affect
the price of the comparable and whether a comparable transaction exists at
all. 136
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPER ROYALTY PROVISION
A. Transferring Intangibles: A Statutory Quagmire
Congress eventually acknowledged, in light of the aforementioned circum-
stances and the growth in the amount of international business, that the ex-
isting regulatory scheme operated ineffectively. Consequently, the 1980s
marked the beginning of a series of congressional enactments designed to
deal with the potential tax avoidance associated with prohibited transfers
and sales of intangible property among commonly controlled companies. In
1982, 1984, and 1986, Congress respectively enacted Code sections 936(h),
367(d), and amended Code section 482.137
The conduct of companies like Eli Lilly forced Congress to reconsider the
existing tax statutes concerning the outbound transfer and sale of intangibles
originating in the United States. 138 Prior to 1982, section 936 granted do-
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (rejecting taxpayer's comparison to 21 distributors in favor of Commissioner's "reason-
able" reallocation); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928 (1970) (finding taxpayer's
statistics-based allocation system arbitrary and unreasonable); Hamburgers York Road, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C. 821 (1964) (holding two corporations subject to § 482 reallocation
based on lack of pressing business need for separate entities).
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) (1968).
134. See § 1.482-2(e)(1).
135. § 1.482-2(e)(1) to -2(e)(4).
136. § 1.482-2(d)(1) to -2(d)(4).
137. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 213(a)(2), 96 Stat. 324, 452; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-361,
§ 131(a), 98 Stat. 494, 662; and Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231,
100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63.
138. Although the Tax Court did not decide Eli Lilly until 1985, the 1982 Senate report on
TEFRA makes reference to the intangible income tax exploitations of "a U.S. pharmaceutical
company." S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1982).
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mestic corporations an optional federal income tax credit. 139 The corpora-
tions earned the credit primarily by actively conducting business in a
possession of the United States. 14° Congress, however, believed that some
companies had abused the tax incentives.141 With the passage of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), Congress added subsection
(h) to section 936.142 Section 936 imposes special income allocation provi-
sions on corporations that take advantage of the tax credit. 143 The alloca-
tions apply to revenue generated from intangibles developed in the United
States and then transferred to possession corporations.
144
Congress next tackled a different problem by enacting section 367(d).145
The problem arose when U.S. companies developed intangibles in the United
States and subsequently used the same intangibles for their foreign manufac-
turing affiliates.146 The evil sought to be prevented occurred when a trans-
feror deducted large amounts for research and development and then
transferred the intangible at the point of profitability, thereby either defer-
ring or eliminating U.S. taxes on the profits attributable to the intangible.
147
Section 367(d) provides for an income-shifting rule similar in theory to the
one in section 936(h).148 The rule generally provides for the shifting of in-
come attributable to intangibles to a transferor if the transaction tradition-
139. See I.R.C. § 936(a)(1) (1954) (stipulating general requirements to qualify for the pos-
session tax credit).
140. Id. § 936(a)(2)(A), (B).
141. The Senate Finance Committee report discussing TEFRA states:
Some taxpayers [had] taken the position that they [could] make tax-free trans-
fers of intangible assets created or acquired in the United States (such as patents,
secret processes and trademarks) to an electing section 936 corporation [i.e., a
possession corporation], and that no allocation of income generated by those
intangibles to the U.S. parent is required....
... [N]o legitimate policy is served by permitting tax-free generation of in-
come related to the intangibles created, developed or acquired in the United
States or elsewhere outside of the possession since that income is not derived
from increased Puerto Rican employment or economic activity. Therefore....
ending the availability of the possession credit for income from such intangibles
is justified.
S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 158-59 (1982).
142. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213(a)(2), 96 Stat. 324, 452 (1982) (adding I.R.C.
§ 936(h)).
143. I.R.C. § 936(h)(1)(A) (1986).
144. Id.; see also § 936(h)(3) (defining intangible property income).
145. DEFRA, Pub. L. No. 98-361, § 131(a), 98 Stat. 494, 662 (1984) (enacting I.R.C.
§ 367(d)).
146. See Driscoll, supra note 64, at 177.
147. Id. The elimination of U.S. taxes on the profits attributable to the intangible results
from the transfer of intangibles to a tax jurisdiction that imposes a rate lower than the U.S. tax
rate. To accomplish the tax reduction, a U.S. corporation would transfer some or all of the
income-producing capacity of the intangible to its low-tax-jurisdiction subsidiary by allowing
the subsidiary to use the intangible for a minimal royalty payment. The subsidiary then ex-
ploits the intangible, producing high profits, but paying the relatively low tax rate of the for-
eign jurisdiction.
148. Code § 367(a) generally nullifies various Code sections' tax-free intercorporate prop-
erty transfer provisions when the transferee is a foreign corporation: "such foreign corpora-
tion shall not . . . be considered . . . a corporation." I.R.C. § 367(a)(1) (1986). Code section
367(d), however, alters the general rule if the asset transferred is intangible property, by treat-
ing the transfer as a sale. See § 367(a), (b), (d).
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ally would qualify for nonrecognition of gain treatment. 49 The amount of
income, if any, depends upon the productivity, use, or disposition of the
intangibles. ' 50
After the enactment of sections 936(h) and 367(d), Congress's control on
U.S. corporations' income shifting tactics remained incomplete. United
States companies could still avoid the implications of sections 936(h) and
367(d) by licensing or selling intangibles to a commonly controlled foreign
affiliate, instead of implementing a section 367 tax-free transfer.' 5' Con-
gress's strategy was to amend section 482 with the TRA of 1986.152
The legislative history of the 1986 Act covering section 482 lays out Con-
gress's reasons for the amendment. 53 Congress was concerned that the pro-
visions of section 482 inadequately allocated income attributable to
intangibles back to the United States parent corporation in certain situa-
tions. 154 Congress recognized a key problem in the case of a U.S. company
transferring intangibles to its related corporation in a low tax jurisdiction,
especially when the transfer involved high value intangibles. Because of the
tax savings available, Congress felt a strong incentive existed for taxpayers to
enter into this type of transaction. 55
Perhaps the most difficult problem Congress faced concerned the nature
of multinational corporations. The relationship between related and unre-
lated parties differs fundamentally.15 6 Multinational companies conduct
business operations as a single economic unit.' 57 Multinational companies
do not treat their foreign affiliates in the same manner they treat unrelated
149. See § 367(a), (b), (d).
150. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 953 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1641. The House report provides:
Transfers of intangible assets in transactions that would otherwise qualify for
nonrecognition of gain are treated as transfers for payments contingent on pro-
ductivity, use, or disposition of the property. The transferor is treated as receiv-
ing payments over the useful life of the intangible property on an annual basis.
Amounts included in gross income by reason of the special rule are treated as
ordinary income from sources within the United States.
Id.
151. See Driscoll, supra note 64, at 180.
152. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63 (1986).
153. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 420 (1985).
154. The House report specifically addresses the problems that accompany the transfer of
intangibles between commonly controlled corporations:
There is a strong incentive for taxpayers to transfer intangibles to related for-
eign corporations or possessions corporations in a low tax jurisdiction, particu-
larly when the intangible has a high value relative to manufacturing or assembly
costs. Such transfers can result in indefinite tax deferral or effective tax exemp-
tion on the earnings, while retaining the value of the earnings in the related
group.
The committee is concerned that the provisions of sections 482, 367(d), and
936 that allocate income to a U.S. transferor of intangibles may not be operating
to assure adequate allocations to the U.S. taxable entity of income attributable
to intangibles in these situations.
Id. at 423.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 424.
157. Id.
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parties.' 58 Multinational companies also incur different levels of risk when
transferring high potential intangibles among affiliates than when transfer-
ring the same intangibles to an unrelated party.159 The multinational's eq-
uity interest enables the whole economic entity to reap the benefits of the
intangibles, irrespective of the transfer price paid for the intangibles.'60 Un-
like corporations bound by the terms of contractual agreements, the mul-
tinational companies can easily adjust the transfer prices annually when
appropriate. 16 1 Therefore, in consideration of all the aforementioned rea-
sons, Congress enacted the controversial one-sentence amendment to section
482 providing that any income with respect to the transfer or sale of in-
tangibles shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangi-
ble. 162 The TRA of 1986 also provides for the Code to extend the same
"commensurate with income" standard to section 367(d) intangible property
transfers to foreign affiliates and to section 936(h) transfer pricing agree-
ments applicable to possessions corporations and their United States
affiliates. 163
B. The Commensurate with Income Standard
The one-sentence amendment to section 482, the super royalty provision,
advocates a commensurate with income standard when dealing with sections
367(d), 936(h), and 482.164 On its face the amendment fails to provide any
guidance as to the meaning of the commensurate with income standard. The
Random House Dictionary of the English Language supplies four possibili-
ties under the word "commensurate."' 165 The second choice gives the defini-





162. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63 (1986). Section
123 1(e)(1) states: "In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." Id. Code section 936(h)(3)(B)
states:
The term "intangible property" means any-
(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how;
(ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition;
(iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name;
(iv) franchise, license, or contract;
(v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast,
estimate, customer list, or technical data; or
(vi) any similar item,
which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual.
I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (1986). Compare this section with Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2(d)(3), supra note 53 (providing an almost identical list of intangibles, with the
exception of "know-how").
163. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(a)(1), (e)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2562-63 (1986).
164. See Looman, supra note 14, at 1 (defining the super royalty concept); see also Levey &
Ruchelman, supra note 124, at 611 (explaining super royalty concept in the context of I.R.C.
§§ 367, 936).
165. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines "commensurate" as:
(1) having the same measure; of equal extent or duration; (2) corresponding in amount, magni-
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example of a person's paycheck being commensurate with the amount of
time worked. 166 From Random House's definition, the application of the
commensurate standard may appear reasonably clear. Fortunately, the leg-
islative history provides some additional insight as to the meaning and appli-
cation of the commensurate with income standard. 167
The legislative history specifically points out that the standard applies to
outright transfers as well as licenses and other arrangements for the use of
intangibles. 168 This stipulation eliminates the previous problem of corpora-
tions entering into licensing or royalty agreements rather than outright
transfers in order to avoid taxes. 169 The committee expressly stated that
neither industry norms nor unrelated party transactions provide a safe har-
bor minimum payment.170
To determine if payments are commensurate with the income attributable
to the intangible requires more than a strict application of a particular
method of allocating income. 17 1 The committee intended for the profit or
income stream generated or associated with the intangible property to serve
as the primary factor in determining an appropriate pricing method.' 7 2 In
addition, all of the facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction are
relevant. 173 The facts and circumstances include the economic risks each
party bears in relation to the particular transaction. 174
The legislative history indicates that an examination into the compensa-
tion for an intangible should not be limited in scope to the facts and circum-
stances existing at the time of the transfer. 17 5 The commensurate with
income standard allows future consideration of the actual profits realized
pursuant to the transfer of intangibles.176 The future consideration of facts
permits adjustments in payments for the intangible in order to account prop-
tude, or degree...; (3) proportionate; adequate; (4) having a common measure; commensura-
ble." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 411 (1987).
166. Id.
167. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 420 (1985). Although both the Senate
Finance Committee and the House of Representatives issued reports on the TRA of 1986,
Report No. 426 (prepared by the House Ways and Means Committee) appears to analyze the
issues pertaining to the super royalty provision with the most thoroughness and insight.
168. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 420, 425 (1985).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 426. Congress specifically refused to mandate the application of the contract
manufacturer or the cost-plus methods. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The committee emphasized:
All the facts and circumstances are to be considered in determining what pricing
methods are appropriate in cases involving intangible property, including the
extent to which the transferee bears real risks with respect to its ability to make
a profit from the intangible or, instead, sells products produced with the intangi-
ble largely to related parties (which may involve little sales risk or activity) and
has a market essentially dependent on, or assured by, such related parties' mar-
keting efforts.
Id.
175. Id. at 425.
176. Id. "The committee intends that consideration also be given the actual profit experi-
ence realized as a consequence of the transfer." Id.
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erly for changes in the amount of income attributable to the intangible. The
legislative history reflects Congress's intent to adjust payments only in situa-
tions involving major changes in income attributable to the intangible. 177
Consequently, congressional intent reflects the understanding that annual
adjustments are not necessary, absent a major change.' 78
The explanation also states that the standard applies to both sections
367(d) and 936.179 Likewise, the section addresses cost-sharing agree-
ments.1 80 The payments under a cost-sharing agreement""1 must equal or
exceed royalty payments the possessions corporation would pay an affiliated
corporation under sections 367 or 482.182
C. Ripples in International Treaty Waters
The 1986 amendment to section 482 mandating the commensurate with
income standard creates much uncertainty in the international arena.1 83
Taxing authorities throughout the world focus concern on the same types of
problems that section 482 addresses, namely the shifting of profits between
related companies that ends up distorting taxpayers' taxable income in the
different tax jurisdictions where they operate. Traditionally, the taxing au-
thorities adjust the profits of related companies through the use of alloca-
tions based on an arm's length standard. 184
In 1977 the Fiscal Committee of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) adopted the Revised Model Double Taxa-
tion Convention on Income and Capital (Model Convention).185 The Model
Convention generated the groundwork for resolving potential taxing con-
flicts among member countries. In 1979 the OECD prepared and adopted a
report titled "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises" (1979 Re-
port) 186 based on the 1977 Model Convention. The 1979 Report first deals
with the problems associated with related companies' practices of distorting
taxable income through the abusive use of intercompany pricing methods. i87
The solution purportedly lies in the application of the arm's length stan-
dard.' 8 8 Article 9(1) of the Model Convention prescribes that when a trans-
177. Id. at 425-26.
178. Id. at 426.
179. Id. at 425-26.
180. Id. at 426.
181. Previously, bona fide cost-sharing agreements enjoyed the benefit of nonallocation
under § 482 as long as both parties shouldered an arm's length share of the costs and risks
related to the development of the product. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4) (1969).
182. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 420, 426 (1985).
183. See Granwell & Hirsh, The Super Royalty: A New International Tax Concept, 33 TAX
NOTES 1037 (1986).
184. Id. at 1047-49.
185. 1977 Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, Apr. 29, 1977,
Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [hereinaf-
ter Model Convention].
186. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, REPORT OF THE OECD COMMIT-
TEE (1979) [hereinafter OECD 1979 REPORT].
187. See id. ch. 1, at 13.
188. Id. at 23.
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action between related parties fails to comply with the arm's length
standard, a reallocation of profits will be made in order to achieve an arm's
length result. 189
The 1979 Report also addresses the problem of double taxation. Double
taxation occurs when an overlap in taxable income exists after separate tax-
ing authorities independently determine the amount of income includable in
their respective tax basis. 190 Specifically, double taxation occurs when a
country arrives at a transfer price, after adjusting inter-company transac-
tions, that includes income previously taxed by another taxing authority. 191
The solution to the problem of double taxation lies in articles 9(2) and 25 of
the Model Convention. Countries following article 9(2) provide for the sub-
sequent taxing authority to decrease the amount of tax owed in a way that
takes into account the tax already imposed on the overlapping profits. 1 9 2
Article 9(2) appears to discriminate against the later taxing authority. Arti-
cle 25, however, includes procedures for achieving mutual agreement be-
tween the "competent authorities" of the taxing jurisdictions in conflict. 193
The competent authorities must negotiate the amounts of the corresponding
adjustments in order to alleviate the burden of double taxation on an
enterprise. 194
United States treaty obligations represent another limit on the broad pow-
ers of the Internal Revenue Service.1 9 5 The 1979 Report describing United
States tax treaties provides for application of an arm's length standard.1 96
The question now arises as to whether the commensurate with income stan-
dard, in light of the White Paper, complies with United States treaty
obligations.
D. The Section 482 White Paper
With the amendment of section 482, members of the private sector, both
domestically and abroad, have begun speculating over the Code section's
reach. One scenario depicts an omnipotent taxing authority with a blank
ticket to allocate income and deductions as necessary in order for royalty
payments to be "commensurate" with the income attributable to the intangi-
ble. A less drastic scenario paints the amendment to section 482 as merely
codifying the use of the section 482 regulation's unspecified fourth method,
resulting in a change of small magnitude.
The legislative history of the super royalty provision of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 strongly urged the IRS to study intercompany pricing rules and
consider possible changes to the regulations providing guidelines for the ap-
189. Id.
190. Id. at 8-9.
191. See Liebman & De Boeck, The International Transfer Pricing of Services, 17 TAX




195. See Schindler, supra note 57, at 380.
196. OECD 1979 REPORT, supra note 186, at 10.
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plication of section 482.197 The completed study, the Section 482 White Pa-
per, asserts that the appropriate standard for international transactions is the
arm's length standard. 19 8 The White Paper then argues that the commensu-
rate with income standard complies with the arm's length standard, and con-
sequently, follows the spirit of international tax treaties. 199 The White Paper
also goes into great depth concerning the application of the commensurate
with income standard and touches on the subject of cost-sharing. 2° °
A thorough examination of section 482 and the entire Internal Revenue
Code fails to produce any definition for "commensurate" or "commensurate
with income." Likewise, the legislative history also fails to define the entire
scope of the commensurate with income standard. The legislative history
mandates the use of the standard for inbound and outbound transfers of all
related party transfers of intangibles. The Treasury Department in the
White Paper widen s the scope of the commensurate with income standard to
apply regardless of qualitative or quantitative restrictions.20 1 The White Pa-
per rejects the proposition that the commensurate with income standard
should apply only to high profit potential intangibles. 20 2
As previously intimated, the commensurate with income standard applies
to both normal and high profit potential intangibles. 20 3 The White Paper
mentions that normal profit intangibles cause few problems with the com-
mensurate with income standard.20 4 Normal profit intangibles commonly
lend themselves to comparison with unrelated party intangibles. 205 The
presence of unrelated comparables assures the existence of an arm's length
price. Therefore, the results of the commensurate with income standard co-
incide with pre-1986 results as long as appropriate comparables exist.
The high profit potential intangibles posed a different challenge to the
drafters of the White Paper. The absence of comparables led to an uproar,
eventually leading to the issuance of the White Paper. Economically, in or-
der to reflect the often minor contributions of a transferee, the transferor
must pay a "super royalty" rate. 20 6 The White Paper gives credence to the
legislative history that requires the IRS to place primary weight on the in-
come attributable to a transferred intangible in the application of the com-
mensurate with income standard. 20 7
The White Paper explains the Treasury Department's and Service's views
on the interpretation of the commensurate with income standard.20 8 The
197. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-637 to -38, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4725-26.
198. White Paper, supra note 16, at 47.
199. Id. at 56.
200. See id. chs. 6, 8, at 45, 63.
201. Id., ch. 6, secs. C, D, at 50, 52.
202. Id. at 52.
203. See id., ch. 6, secs. C, D, at 50, 52.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 51.
207. See id., ch. 6, pt. A, at 45 (discussing legislative history).
208. Id. at 1-2.
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White Paper provides an economic perspective-functional analysis-in de-
termining the appropriate transfer price in difficult situations, particularly in
the case of super royalties. 20 9 Beginning with the amount of income derived
from the sale of a particular product, the functional analysis method splits
the amount of income into two distinct categories, tangible income and in-
tangible income. 210 The identification of the intangible income represents
the first step in the functional analysis method of allocating income.2 1 The
next step of the functional analysis involves the proper allocation of the in-
tangible income between the related companies. In order to allocate the in-
tangible income, functional analysis requires close economic scrutiny of all
factors necessary in bringing the product to and through the various stages
of production. The economic analysis predicts the amount of return that the
related companies' manufacturing operations should produce and hence acts
as the main tool for allocating intangible income between the related compa-
nies in a way that properly reflects their respective efforts. 212
The economic analysis of the factors of production requires the assign-
ment of various rates of return to the factors. 21 3 Examples include the ex-
pected economic rate of return for manufacturing plants and labor forces.2 14
In order to complete the economic analysis, functional analysis places much
emphasis on examining the costs and risks borne by each party.215 The re-
sults of the functional analysis should necessarily lead to the proper alloca-
tion of the intangible income. Upon the completion of the functional
analysis, the IRS must decide if the amount the manufacturer paid for the
intangible, either outright or in the form of a royalty, properly takes into
account the allocation of intangible income.
The White Paper depicts the commensurate with income standard and the
arm's length principle as consistent approaches to dealing with transfer pric-
ing problems. The White Paper posits that the application of functional
analysis on the actual profit experiences from an intangible exemplifies the
behavior of unrelated parties in the same or similar facts and circumstances.
The commensurate with income standard applies a functional analysis ap-
proach to an intangible's income. Thus, the commensurate with income
standard is consistent with the arm's length principle. 21 6
The same logic applies to the use of periodic adjustments under the com-
mensurate with income standard. The commensurate with income standard
requires the use of periodic adjustments to reflect appropriately the actual
profit experienced under a license for intangibles.2 1 7 Potentially high-profit
intangibles under long-term, fixed royalty rate licenses (originally negotiated
209. Id. at 47.
210. Id.
211. See procedure set out infra in section III.B. (illustrating the steps involved in func-
tional analysis as applied to a hypothetical bicycle manufacturer).
212. White Paper, supra note 16, at 84.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 86 (using the term "measurable assets").
215. Id. at 54.
216. Id. at 84.
217. Id. at 63.
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at arm's length) exemplify a situation in which the White Paper strongly
recommends periodic adjustments.218 When these intangibles subsequently
realize high profits, the absence of periodic adjustments allows taxpayers
substantial unplanned tax savings.219 Following the arm's length approach,
avoidance of periodic adjustments and the accompanying increase in tax
burden requires a showing that unrelated parties dealing at an arm's length
basis would not require any adjustments. 220 Thus, a taxpayer may avoid
periodic adjustments and avoid an increase in tax burden. Conversely, if
changing circumstances require unrelated parties to renegotiate and adjust
royalty payments, the White Paper's application, consistent with the arm's
length standard, requires periodic adjustments to the royalty rate.221 Conse-
quently, periodic adjustments under the commensurate with income stan-
dard follow arm's length principles. 222
The consistency of the commensurate with income standard and arm's
length principles arguably helps to control, or at least does not aggravate,
the problems of double taxation. While insisting that the arm's length stan-
dard in U.S. tax treaties remains intact, the White Paper acknowledges the
lack of comparables in the area of potentially high profit intangibles. 223 Be-
cause of the arm's length standard's inability to handle the super royalty
type of situation, the commensurate with income standard fills this gap in
the tax treaties. Through the application of the commensurate with income
standard, the United States theoretically should be able to handle the con-
flicting interpretations of the arm's length standard offered by our treaty
partners. 224
The White Paper describes the application of the commensurate with in-
come standard in great detail. 225 The Paper also makes reference to cost-
sharing agreements. 226 In accordance with legislative intent, cost-sharing
agreements no longer enjoy protection from section 482.227 All bona fide
cost-sharing agreements must comply with the commensurate with income
standard. 228
218. Id. The White Paper stresses that Congress directed "the Service to make adjust-
ments to intangible returns that reflect the actual profit experience [which] is in part a legisla-
tive rejection of R.T. French v. Comm'r." Id.
219. See id. The White Paper implies that practical negotiators generally enter long-term
royalty rate agreements that include a mechanism allowing for rate adjustments over time. Id.
220. Id. at 71.
221. Id. at 66.
222. Id. at 71.
223. See id. at 54 (noting lack of comparables for high profit potential intangibles); see also
id. ch. 7, at 56 (asserting no deviation from arm's length standard concept).
224. Id. at 62.
225. Chapter 11, entitled "Arm's Length Methods for Evaluating Transactions Involving
Intangible Property," provides complex illustrations and step-by-step guidance for applying
the commensurate with income standard-highly reminiscent of the 1968 regulations. See id.
at 87-108.
226. See id. at 54; see generally id. at 109-20.
227. Code § 936(h)(5)(C) puts restraints on income calculated according to cost-sharing
agreements if the taxpayer elects out of the general rule for tax treatment of intangible prop-
erty income. I.R.C. § 936(h)(1), (5)(C) (1986). The White Paper also endorses restrictions on
sharing agreements. White Paper, supra note 16, at 126-27.
228. White Paper, supra note 16, at 126.
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III. THE BASIC VARIABLE FORMULA: A PROPOSAL FOR COHESION IN
THE METAPHYSICAL WORLD OF INTANGIBLES
A. Functional Analysis in Theory
The companies subject to the highest prospects for encountering a section
482 controversy have traditionally enjoyed extremely high royalties, from
which the IRS would like its fair share. 229 These companies' "super royal-
ties" evidence a recent phenomenon. Congress's legislative effort to deal
with super royalties did not appear until the passage of the TRA of 1986.230
One main goal of the post-1986 section 482 pricing structure centers around
achieving an arm's length price for transactions between related parties. The
White Paper stresses that in arriving at an arm's length price, exactly com-
parable transactions carry the most weight and are always preferred. 231
One side effect of the relatively new phenomenon of super royalties is the
lack of exact comparables. The solution appears to be functional analysis,
implemented under the commensurate with income standard. Functional
analysis is touted in the White Paper as the regulations' appropriate, unspec-
ified "fourth method," but in reality the White Paper reclassifies and ex-
pands the previous methods used in determining transfer prices. The White
Paper, like the Code, also fails to provide an ironclad definition of the phrase
''commensurate with income." Examples of functional analysis applied
under the commensurate with income standard appear in abundance in the
White Paper, 232 but the phrase remains ambiguous and subject to
interpretation.
Attempting to apply the White Paper's functional analysis method under
the commensurate with income standard subjects the taxpayer to considera-
ble uncertainty. The application of the functional analysis method relies on
the economic analysis of factors of production implemented by a manufac-
turing entity. Functional analysis includes calculating economic rates of re-
turn on the various factors of production. The White Paper provides little or
no guidance on how to establish uniformity and comparability in the use of
these rates that play such an integral role in the government's scheme. In
order to calculate an appropriate transfer price, functional analysis should
incorporate as many predictable and quantitative elements as possible. At a
minimum, the economic rates of return should originate from a uniform
source, thereby reducing unknowns and increasing security for the taxpayer.
B. Functional Analysis Applied
An example best serves to compare the conceptual aspects of both the
traditional arm's length method of transfer pricing and the functional analy-
229. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1988, § D, at 4, col. 1. The New York Times quoted Gerald
Portney, former associate general counsel of the IRS, as saying: "Transfer pricing has become
an area that the [S]ervice believes is a major potential source of significant revenue. In the last
several years, there's been a major buildup in this area at the I.R.S. in terms of resources." Id.
230. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2561-63 (1986).
231. White Paper, supra note 16, at 106.
232. See id., sec. III, at 79-108.
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sis approach. Assume that an American company, Le Tour, engages in the
business of developing, manufacturing, and marketing high performance bi-
cycles. The goal of all high performance bicycle designers and manufactur-
ers is to produce a model that weighs very little, and yet functions as well or
better than heavier bikes. The lightest high performance bicycles on the
market weigh between seventeen and twenty-one pounds. The four-pound
difference results in a retail price differential of two to three thousand dollars
per bike.
Le Tour recently produced a new bicycle, Le Light, after many years of
research and development. Le Light weighs only thirteen pounds, and per-
forms as well if not better than the heavier cycles. Le Tour sets up a manu-
facturing subsidiary, Le Plant, in foreign county L, which has a lower
income tax rate that the United States. Le Tour licenses the technical know-
how to produce the bikes to Le Plant. The technology represents all of the
research and development efforts of Le Tour. The subsidiary agrees to pay
Le Tour a royalty of $100 per bike for the use of Le Tour's intangible, the
technology. Le Plant then sells the bikes to the parent company for $3,000
each. Le Tour subsequently packages the bikes in custom boxes and markets
Le Light through its sources for $5,000 per bike.
The Internal Revenue Service audits the parent corporation, applying the
new super royalty provision as interpreted in the White Paper. The Service
finds the arm's length standard ineffective in determining an appropriate
transfer price. The arm's length standard requires the comparison of Le
Plant's transfer price to the price at which unrelated parties would buy and
sell bikes comparable to Le Light. No other bicycle manufacturer produces
a bike comparable to Le Light, however, since its unique aluminum alloy
puts it in a class by itself. The Service, therefore, cannot compare Le Tour's
pricing scheme with any other parties, related or unrelated.
The IRS's examiners realize a gap exists in the arm's length standard as a
tool for allocating income of related organizations. The White Paper pro-
vides the means to seal this gap. The Service initially examines Le Light's
various costs of production and determines that $500 of the total income
derived from the sale of a single bike represents intangible income. The $500
reflects the efforts of both Le Tour and Le Plant in designing and producing
the end product. The question becomes one of how to allocate properly the
$500 of intangible income.
Le Plant's factors of production include the plant, equipment, and labor
necessary to manufacture the bicycles. The parent company financed most
of the cost of setting up the plant, and as a result bears the clear majority of
the risk in the operations of Le Plant. The IRS correlates the expected rates
of return with the factors of production, taking into account the respective
costs and risks of Le Tour and Le Plant. After a careful and detailed analy-
sis, the Service determines that Le Tour must recognize $350 of intangible
income per bike, and Le Plant the remaining $150.
In the previous situation, Le Tour's income, with respect to its licensing of
technology to Le Plant, fell short of qualifying as commensurate with the
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income attributable to this intangible. The increase in the royalty payment,
$250, equals the intangible income of Le Tour, $350, less the original royalty
payment of $100. The increase in the royalty from Le Plant to Le Tour
results in an increased income realization for Le Tour, located in a tax juris-
diction with a higher rate than Le Plant's. Thus the entire entity, consisting
of the parent corporation and its subsidiary, now has fewer after-tax dollars
than prior to the government's section 482 reallocation.
C. Treaty Considerations
The treaty obligations of the United States have historically put an effec-
tive restraint on the power of section 482.233 The universally accepted stan-
dard applied in transfer pricing is the arm's length price. 23 4 When the
United States' treaty partners feel a taxing policy conflicts with the arm's
length principle, they respond in the same manner as they would to any
perceived treaty violation. For foreign taxing jurisdictions to accept func-
tional analysis while remaining in compliance with treaty provisions that
prohibit double taxation will effect a decrease in the foreign country's tax
revenue. The loss of tax revenue resulting from the United States' imposi-
tion of its super royalty provision will undoubtedly be a source of major
international controversy.
To alleviate the problem of foreign taxing jurisdictions rejecting functional
analysis and consequently entering into a stalemate of tax negotiations, the
White Paper stresses that the commensurate with income standard clearly
falls within the arm's length standard. 235 Arguably the application of the
commensurate with income standard through use of the functional analysis
method produces results reasonably consistent with those arrived at by unre-
lated parties dealing at arm's length. Nevertheless, the complexity and un-
certainty over what to include in the White Paper's interpretive formulation
of the commensurate with income standard cast a dark shadow over the
White Paper's consistency argument. Treaty partners armed with U.S. trea-
ties that clearly embody the traditional arm's length standard with regard to
prices might easily reject the White Paper's consistency argument. Func-
tional analysis creates a royalty rate for the use of, or a transfer price for the
outright sale of, intangibles by determining an amount of intangible income.
Nevertheless, the actual use of factors of production, economic rates of re-
turn, and the costs and risks of the various parties to arrive at intangible
income abandons the traditional application of the arm's length standard.
D. The Basic Variable Formula
The success of the commensurate with income standard depends upon its
233. See Looman, supra note 14, at 6. Looman makes the observation that "[a]rticle 9 of
the OECD and U.S. model treaties obligate treaty partners to agree on transfer pricing adjust-
ments so that adjustments to only one member of a multinational group will not result in
double taxation." Id.
234. See OECD Report, supra note 186, at 10; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(i).
235. White Paper, supra note 16, at 55.
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full-fledged application domestically, as well as its acceptance by the United
States' treaty partners. The obstacle in the path of the standard's success lies
in its practical application, not in the standard's concept. A Basic Variables
Formula (BVF) approach to functional analysis provides a means of practi-
cal application that is in accordance with the commensurate with income
standard. The BVF is determined by:
[(expected rate of return) X (factors of production)] + (costs borne by
both parties) + (risks borne by both parties) = intangible income to be
allocated to each party
Comparing each party's intangible income to the royalty payment yields the
amount of reallocation.
The elements "expected rates of return" and "factors of production"
should be carefully spelled out. Uniform expected rates of return provide
some security for the party attempting to calculate the proper allocation or
justify the end result. A specific list of the factors of production also de-
creases the amount of uncertainty for taxpayers and foreign taxing authori-
ties. Use of the BVF will allow taxpayers to comply more easily with the
statute. More importantly, foreign taxing authorities may perceive the BVF
functional analysis as a useful tool in filling the gaps created by the arm's
length standard. The simplicity of application plays an important role in
promoting the idea of functional analysis internationally.
In the past, corporations acting in good faith have futilely expended sub-
stantial resources in an effort to comply with the government's ambiguous
and complex taxing scheme. Under the White Paper's interpretation of
functional analysis, arriving at a transfer price that the Service will find
palatable continues to be a venture through a maze. Even a preliminarily
accurate calculation runs the risk of subsequent periodic adjustments.
Rather than frustrating the private sector to the point of noncompliance, the
Service should implement a BVF approach to the section 482 regulations
and recognize the indirect tax benefits of a less encumbered business
environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Operating in a tax system that generally perceives corporations as separate
entities, American corporations have long recognized the advantage of shift-
ing the revenues and expenses of various companies under common owner-
ship control to achieve maximum tax benefits. The dynamics of group
operations provide many opportunities for related entities to distort income.
Congress, however, has not been oblivious to the problem since it addressed
the issue in laws dating back to 1917.
Congress's early attempts to control related companies' tax avoidance fo-
cused on grouping companies' income tax reports into one consolidated re-
turn. When the consolidated return approach proved ineffective, Congress
took far more drastic measures by enacting Code section 45, the predecessor
to section 482. Section 482 gave the Internal Revenue Service the power to
allocate income and deductions of related corporations seemingly at will. In
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the 1960s the Service provided limited protection from what some felt were
arbitrary intrusions by issuing regulations that emphasized an arm's length
standard in intercorporate transactions.
Inexorably, the increasing complexity of business transactions accompa-
nied the passage of time. Companies began to transfer both tangible and
intangible goods between related affiliates in order to maximize operations.
Transfer pricing ultimately outgrew the regulatory scheme placed on it by
Congress and the IRS. The government's 1968 regulations proved but a
temporary stay to the problems, especially in the area of intangibles. In re-
sponse to its eroding statutory infrastructure, Congress, in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, amended Code section 482 by adding the super royalty provi-
sion with its commensurate with income standard.
The undefined commensurate with income standard caused considerable
speculation in the tax community, domestically and internationally. In a
purported effort to explain the application of the super royalty provision and
reconcile it with the terms of existing tax treaties, the Treasury Department
and the IRS issued the Section 482 White Paper, a 129-page study of in-
tercompany pricing. The White Paper sets forth the government's official
position on the Code's income allocation provisions as applied under the
commensurate with income standard.
The White Paper's analysis of the commensurate with income standard
relies heavily upon the acceptance of a functional analysis method of allocat-
ing the income from intangibles. Rather than presenting a strong argument
in support of the standard, the White Paper quickly manifests the method's
weakness, complexity, and uncertainty. Based on its use of economic theo-
ries, functional analysis appears incongruent with the arm's length standard.
The White Paper's argument that the commensurate with income standard
falls within the arm's length standard is a thin facade, but necessary predi-
cate, designed to promote international acceptance of the commensurate
with income standard.
The awesome task of trying to apply the commensurate with income stan-
dard clouds an otherwise extremely viable theory. Domestic taxpayers' frus-
tration and treaty parties' skepticism necessitate converting the presentation
of the commensurate with income standard into a practical form. The Basic
Variable Formula helps to clarify and in turn promote acceptance of the
commensurate with income standard. The BVF's relative straightforward-
ness in comparison to the White Paper's ubiquitous abstractions provides the
foundation for its domestic and international acceptance as a practical
means to implement the commensurate with income standard. Rather than
bombarding the players in the world market with reams of unclear regula-
tions, the Service needs to turn its perspective towards a long-term, stabiliz-
ing approach to regulating the actions of international, commonly controlled
entities.
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